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This article argues that the role of pre-war grievances as a predictor of violence against civilians in civil wars may have been systematically 
underestimated because the “grievance hypothesis” has not been properly tested. Pre-war grievances can only affect civilian victimization in 
civil wars if they have been intensely mobilized in the lead-up to the conflict and a temporary collapse of state capacity also occurs. This article 
presents a “fair test” of the grievance hypothesis. It analyses in depth a specific case of a pre-war grievance that met these two conditions: 
conflict around land property rights in Catalonia before the Spanish Civil War and its effects on violence against civilians during the war. The 
results show a non-negligible effect of pre-war grievances on civilian victimization. 
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Are pre-war grievances a good predictor of violence against 
civilians during civil war? It makes intuitive sense that people 
suffering from high levels of inequality, exploitation and injus-
tice, can, under certain circumstances, turn to violence to re-
dress their grievances. Popular explanations of revolution, vio-
lent social change and terrorism routinely rely on the notions 
of exploitation and injustice as powerful driving forces for vio-
lent collective action. And, yet, most recent analyses on the 
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causes of civil wars have systematically disregarded griev-
ances as a relevant independent variable, while analyses on 
violence against civilians during civil wars have largely ignored 
pre-war grievances: this kind of violence is mostly considered 
endogenous to the conflict. While potential grievances are per-
vasive, there is important variation, both between and within 
wars, in violence against civilians. 
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We will argue in this article that one possible reason for the 
observed no-effect of pre-war grievances on violence against 
civilians in civil wars is because the grievances hypothesis has 
not been properly tested. We propose to add two conditions 
that may be necessary for factually existing pre-war grievances 
to predict variation in violence during wars. First, an intense 
political mobilization of grievances in the pre-war years. And, 
second, a window of opportunity to direct violence against ci-
vilians. This second condition is frequent in civil war situations: 
there is much evidence of at least temporary loss of state ca-
pacity to police violence against civilians in civil wars, some-
times in particular regions.  
This article presents a test of the grievance thesis. It analyses 
in depth a specific case of a pre-war grievance that met the 
two conditions that we believe can explicate the potential of 
grievances for generating violence during wars: intense pre-war 
mobilization and temporary collapse of state capacity. This 
case is the conflict around land property rights in Catalonia 
before the Spanish Civil War and its effects on violence against 
civilians during the war. 
 
1. Theory 
According to most analyses, civilian victimization in civil wars 
is endogenous to the war itself. In some cases, it is argued, 
violence is a by-product of looting that, as a reward for joining, 
can be decisive to insurgent groups’ capacity to recruit new 
combatants (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). The type of resources 
under the control of rebel organizations and the degree of en-
forcement of internal discipline determine the extent to which 
the search for material benefits turns into violence against ci-
vilians. Similarly, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) argue that 
geographical variation in civilian killings is largely determined 
by the internal discipline warring factions. The internal disci-
pline of rebel organizations, in turn, usually depends on the 
type of resources they have access to: in an environment rich 
in readily available resources, rebel groups are less interested 
 
1 This equilibrium is likely to change, though, when there are 
more than two warring factions, as was the case in the West Bank 
and Gaza in 2006–2008. When there are more than two actors, 
the strongest (in this case, Israel) will be able to apply selective 
violence in zones under the hegemonic control of the other two 
in securing civilian cooperation, and are more willing to allow 
looting and other destructive behaviour in order to recruit com-
batants (Weinstein 2007). In the specific case of sexual vio-
lence against civilians (especially women), the internal disci-
pline of the group and its incentives to forestall this type of 
violence seem also to be important variables (Wood 2008).  
Another set of explanations stress territorial control and in-
formation asymmetries. According to Kalyvas (2006), variation 
in violence against civilians is explained by the distribution of 
control of the territory between warring factions. Selective vio-
lence is more likely in territories where one faction has hege-
monic but not total control. Here, the dominant authority has 
both incentives to crush opposition and the capacity to protect 
informants. By contrast, in zones where control is evenly di-
vided between two factions, selective violence is not possible, 
because the factions are unable to credibly protect informants. 
In those zones, any violence that occurs will be indiscriminate.1 
The explanation of violence as a consequence of competition 
between warring factions for control of territory makes more 
sense in irregular civil wars, less in more conventional cases. 
Herreros and Criado (2009) have advocated two logics of vio-
lence against civilians in conventional civil wars: arbitrary vio-
lence as a consequence of the collapse of the state and pre-
emptive violence targeting the rear areas. According to Balcells 
(2010, 2017) violence against civilians in conventional civil 
wars is not just a way to secure control of territory, but to obtain 
political dominance over political rivals. As the application of 
violence is costly (in terms of international backlash, retaliation 
or local uprisings in response), violence against civilians will 
be greater where support is evenly divided between warring 
factions, and a comparatively small number of killings can tilt 
the balance. 
Pre-war grievances are notably absent from these analyses 
of civilian victimization in civil wars. Violence is the conse-
quence of war dynamics: either a by-product of the combat 
itself, or a strategy to gain control of territory or to obtain polit-
ical dominance in territory already controlled. Violence can 
(Bhavnani et al. 2011). A recent study on the Algerian civil war, 
in turn, concluded that selective violence was actually greater 
where control was split between government and rebel forces 
(Hagelstein 2008). 
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also take the form of retaliation for grievances generated dur-
ing the war, in a process potentially descending into a spiral of 
violence (Balcells 2017). Pre-war grievances seem simply too 
pervasive to explain major cross-sectional and time-series var-
iation in violence. Many groups experience economic and po-
litical inequality and discrimination, but not all of them resort 
to violence during civil war. There are some analyses, though, 
that include pre-war grievances as an important explanatory 
variable to explain civil war outbreaks (not so much violence 
against civilians during the war). These exceptions include Cos-
talli and Ruggeri (2015) on the role of emotions such as indig-
nation derived from pre-war grievances and participation in 
partisan groups during the Italian Civil War of 1943–45, and 
Cederman et al. (2013) on the role of horizontal inequalities 
and the systematic exclusion of ethnic groups from government 
in triggering civil war.  
In this article we will test whether, under certain circum-
stances, pre-war grievances can contribute to explaining war-
time violence against civilians. By civilians we mean non-com-
batants, and the type of violence we are referring to is direct 
violence against civilians. One possible reason for the mis-
match between the number of aggrieved groups and the num-
ber of episodes of violence against civilians – and one that has 
not been thoroughly tested so far – is that not all groups that 
suffer from inequalities or discrimination are equally mobilized 
before the outbreak of the war. Collective action theory tells us 
that material resources, the presence of political entrepreneurs 
and a window of opportunity for political mobilization are all 
important activators of social movements. Only when these 
conditions are met, do grievances become salient. Salient 
grievances, in turn, can lead endogenously to polarization and 
conflict escalation. In the rest of this section we will explain 
how grievances could partly explain violence once a country is 
immersed in a civil war.  
First of all, grievances can generate certain emotions in the 
aggrieved party. If a person feels cheated, this can trigger emo-
tions such as anger and indignation (De Francisco 2014). 
These two emotions are closely linked to the desire to punish 
the cheater. Punishment of defectors has been extensively 
documented in numerous experiments using collective action 
games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Trust Game or the 
Public Goods Game (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Putterman 
2014). In some cases, this punishment is even altruistic, in 
the sense that the punisher assumes the cost of punishing the 
opportunist without deriving any material benefits, even in the 
form of reputation gains. There is abundant evidence from neu-
roscience, though, that the punisher actually experiences a 
pleasure effect – located in the dorsal striatum – when retriev-
ing what he or she sees as unjust and/or opportunistic behav-
iour (see De Quervain et al. 2004). The literature on political 
violence also provides evidence on the role of emotions in vi-
olent collective action. According to Wood (2003), an emo-
tional response to a perceived injustice seemed to be the main 
driving force of peasants’ decisions to support guerrilla forces 
in the civil war in El Salvador. Although many of them partici-
pated in social movements calling for economic and social re-
form in the years before the war, moral commitments, outrage 
and defiance – rather than material incentives – seemed to be 
the paramount reasons for participation in the war (especially 
given that most of them apparently thought that victory was 
very unlikely) (Wood 2003, 18). According to Korf’s (2005) 
analysis of the war in Sri Lanka, the fight for justice was a pow-
erful motivation for violent individual and collective action. 
Costalli and Ruggeri (2015), in turn, have shown a connection 
between powerful emotions such as indignation and participa-
tion in the partisan movement in Italy in 1943–45. 
Political mobilization by political entrepreneurs can have sev-
eral effects on the likelihood of violence being used against 
those regarded as responsible for injustice. It can, firstly, rein-
force the subjective perception of injustice. Secondly, it can 
generate anger and indignation in people without direct expe-
rienced of the grievance. Political mobilization provides infor-
mation about the injustice to other members of the community. 
Even if they have not experienced the injustice themselves, 
they are more likely to feel anger and indignation and, as a 
consequence, a desire to punish the perpetrator, if the griev-
ance have been made salient by a political entrepreneur. 
Thirdly, the political entrepreneur provides an ideological 
framework for interpretation of the grievance that offers a 
broader justification – in terms of the common good of the 
community, for example – for the desire to redress the injustice 
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and for the means – including violent ones – to do so. There-
fore, while the injustice itself is enough to trigger anger and 
indignation in those who experience it, mobilization by political 
entrepreneurs makes these grievances more salient for those 
who have not directly experienced it and can supply ideological 
justification for the desire to punish those held responsible 
(and provide the means to do so). A group of people may suf-
fer from economic, political or social discrimination, but unless 
these grievances have been mobilized and made salient during 
the years prior to the conflict they will probably not lead to 
violence during a subsequent war. Violent riots in India, for in-
stance, did not derive automatically from existing ethnic divi-
sions between Hindus and Muslims, but from prerequisites in-
cluding the presence of political entrepreneurs willing to mobi-
lize the ethnic-religious issue to divert popular support away 
from class politics (Wilkinson 2004). Ethnic polarization per se 
does not lead to violence; indeed, if variation is allowed in lev-
els of issue salience among individuals, equal levels of ethnic 
polarization can lead to different outcomes of conflict onset 
(Bhavnani and Miodownik 2009). Once the issue has been 
mobilized, political entrepreneurs can be willing to use vio-
lence to extract rents – for example, political support from the 
aggrieved population, as in the case of India. In the case of 
the Rwandan genocide, coalitions of local actors mobilized the 
Hutu population against the Tutsis and adopted a policy of kill-
ing as a way of consolidating their power (see Straus 2008). 
In many poor countries in transition to democracy, mobilization 
of aggressive ethnic nationalism has served the interests of 
groups and political entrepreneurs willing to exclude ethnic mi-
norities, the working class, rival elites and other political oppo-
nents from political participation. Slobodan Milosevic’s mobi-
lization of Serb nationalism served both to gather popular sup-
port for threatened elites of the former one-party state and to 
demobilize support for the liberal opposition (Snyder 2000). 
In other cases, violence can be seen as a way to settle dis-
putes, for example around property rights. The killing of the 
 
2 Additionally, the deterioration of state authority and the parallel 
collapse of the cost of illegal behavior can be associated with in-
dividual-level violence in terms of vengeance and criminality. In 
this sense, there is evidence of an increase of criminality and pri-
vate vengeance in zones where a civil war has debilitated state 
adversary can be seen as a way to settle the matter once and 
for all.  
Finally, the opportunity to redress perceived injustices can 
lead from grievances through political mobilization to violence. 
In some cases, especially during civil wars, this is related to a 
temporary collapse or deterioration of state capacity. When the 
state retains its monopoly of force, illegal violence is subject 
to state sanctions. The costs attached to violence diminish 
drastically when state authority collapses. And partial or total 
state collapse is a frequent event in civil wars. In the Bosnian 
civil war, for example, it has been argued that the “security 
dilemmas” derived from the collapse of the state explains most 
of the violence (see for example Hardin 1995 and Walter 
1999). In the case of Rwanda, the crisis of state authority after 
the assassination of president Habyarimana created a “win-
dow of opportunity” that allowed the strategic use of violence 
by local elites in some areas, sometimes in coordination with 
elements of the army (Straus 2008).2 In 1943–45 Italy, polit-
ical violence was facilitated by state failure after the armistice 
with the allies and German occupation (Costalli and Ruggeri 
2015). There is also some evidence that a specific form of po-
litical violence, rape by insurgent groups, is more prevalent in 
situations of partial state collapse (Cohen 2013). In this con-
text of state collapse, we argue, salient grievances can predict 
violence – alongside endogenous wartime revenges and com-
mon criminality. Going beyond the usual understanding of the 
effects of state collapse on violence against civilians, we argue 
that the presence of mobilized pre-war grievances in interac-
tion with the partial collapse of the state that normally follows 
civil war outbreaks can partly explain violence against civilians 
during civil wars. 
In our paper we focus on the case of a specific pre-war griev-
ance: contested property rights in Catalonia during the years 
leading up to the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39, and its influ-
ence on violence against civilians during the war. It is im-
portant to stress that we are not trying to explain all political 
authority, as in Chechnya (Andienko and Shelley 2005) and Co-
lombia (Sánchez et al. 2005). In Mexico, rural violence is also 
more pervasive in remote areas where state enforcement is weak 
(Villarreal 2004). 
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violence in Catalonia during the war, but to explore the corre-
lation between a specific pre-war grievance and violence. The 
case analysis will allow us to draw conclusions about the role 
of pre-war grievances in generating violence against civilians. 
The case exhibits the two conditions for a fair test of the griev-
ance hypothesis: it was heavily mobilized during the immediate 
pre-war years, and a window of opportunity that severely di-
minished the costs of applying violence opened during the first 
four months of the war.  
During the Spanish Second Republic (1931–36) open elec-
tions and free political participation were possible for the first 
time in the country’s history. The result, however, was not a 
consolidated and stable democracy, but a high level of politi-
cal instability. The Second Republic, in this sense, could be 
considered a good example of how weak democratic institu-
tions and opportunistic political entrepreneurs can lead to po-
litical instability and conflict during transitions to democracy 
(Snyder and Jervis 1999). In the specific case of Catalonia 
during the Second Republic, the conflict over property rights 
between “rabassaires” (sharecroppers) and landowners – 
spurred by the phylloxera wine blight that devastated European 
vineyards in the late nineteenth century – led to unprecedented 
levels of mobilization by political parties (Esquerra Republi-
cana) and tenants’ unions (Unió de Rabasaires) during the 
1930s. This case is also characterized by the existence of fa-
vourable conditions for collective action: a collective of share-
croppers with a certain level of material resources, living in rel-
atively small and equal communities, coupled with the pres-
ence of political entrepreneurs from political parties with an 
electoral incentive to mobilize these communities around the 
issue of property rights. These favourable conditions are re-
flected in the development of “rabassaire” unions such as the 
Unió de Traballadors del Camp and the Lliga de Viticultors Ra-
bassaires de Catalunya beginning in the 1870s and culminat-
ing in the creation of the Unió de Rabassaires in 1922 (Pomés 
2000). Political conditions in 1930s Spain also favoured po-
litical mobilization and collective action, and the temporary 
collapse of state authority in the first months of the civil war 
created a window of opportunity for violence. Whether and how 
the presence of this highly mobilized pre-war grievance af-
fected violence against civilians during the civil war is the sub-
ject of this article. 
 
2. Historical Background: The Case of the Rabassa Morta 
in Catalonia and the Spanish Civil War 
The Rabassa Morta conflict between rabassaires (sharecrop-
pers) and landowners in the Catalonian vineyards began at the 
end of the nineteenth century, after the phylloxera epidemic 
wiped out all the vines and ended the customary Rabassa 
Morta contracts (which were often several centuries old), and, 
therefore, to the need to negotiate new contracts. In general 
terms, the post-phylloxera contracts were detrimental for the 
sharecroppers (Giralt 1964, 60), although Carmona and Simp-
son (1999) dispute this. From the 1870s and 1880s, as noted 
before, the conflict between landowners and sharecroppers 
became increasingly mobilized through the creation of rabas-
saire unions. The Unió de Rabassaries, created in 1922, be-
came the main instrument for the mobilization of sharecrop-
pers’ grievances. 
The mobilization of the “rabassaire question” reached new 
heights during the Spanish Second Republic (1931–36). Am-
bitious land reform laws adopted by the Republican-socialist 
government in 1932 and by the left-wing Popular Front gov-
ernment in 1936 were generally detrimental to large landown-
ers and beneficial to landless peasants. In the same spirit, the 
Republic also passed several laws in favour of rural tenant 
farmers. The 1931 tenancy law altered the conditions of ten-
ancy contracts, freezing rents and protecting tenants from evic-
tions. Although the law did not actually target rabassa morta 
contracts, Catalan sharecroppers nonetheless used the new 
legal framework to mobilize to improve their contracts. Stretch-
ing the interpretation of the tenancy law of 1931, sharecrop-
pers now petitioned for a lower share of the harvest to be given 
to the landowners, which led to a wave of more than 30,000 
petitions to revise the conditions of sharecropping contracts, 
most of them dismissed by the courts (Generalitat de Catalu-
nya, Els contractes de conreu). Landowners retaliated, evicting 
or reporting sharecroppers who refused to pay their full share 
of the harvest. 
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In Autonomous Catalonia, a progressive government led by 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalonian Republican 
Left) and with close contacts with rabassaire unions reformed 
the law on tenancy and sharecropping contracts in April 1934, 
but the legislation was declared unconstitutional by the Span-
ish Constitutional Court (Tribunal de Garantías Constitucion-
ales). In October, the Catalan government declared a general 
strike (which was also declared by left-wing forces in other 
parts of Spain at the same time) and unilaterally declared the 
“Catalan State within the Spanish Federal Republic” (Casa-
nova 2007, 129). Many local councils also declared the “Estat 
Català” (Catalan State).  
Yet things quickly turned sour for the Catalan revolutionaries 
as the centre-right government in Madrid ordered the repres-
sion of the Catalan uprising with the intervention of the army 
and the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard, the main security force of 
the state). The government suspended Catalan autonomy and 
annulled the Catalan law of rural contracts. More than three 
thousand people were arrested and the Catalan President Lluís 
Companys was sentenced to thirty years in prison. The top of-
ficials of the Catalan security forces (mossos d’esquadra and 
somaten) were sentenced to death, although the penalty was 
later commuted (Casanova 2007, 139–40). 
Amid the repression of the sharecroppers’ movement, land-
owners had a free hand to evict militant sharecroppers (Unió 
de Rabassaires, 1935). Around 1,400 rabassaires were 
evicted between October 1934 and November 1935 (Giralt 
1964, 70), thanks to the provisions of the new Law on Rural 
Contracts approved by the Spanish parliament in May 1935 
(López Esteve 2013).3 In December 1935, the Unió de Rabas-
saires, the main rabassaire union, declared that “the peasants 
will not forget the injustices they were suffering under these 
new policies” (López Esteve 2013, 378–79). The following ex-
amples illustrate the point: In Collbató a sharecropper who had 
worked the same plot of land for twenty-one years as a rabas-
saire and twelve as a sharecropper under a parceria contract 
was evicted immediately after the October events. The land-
owner kept the entire harvest and uprooted all the vines 
 
3 Despite these evictions, landowners seem not to have tried to 
replace tenants with wage labourers (see Domenech and Herre-
ros 2017) 
planted by the sharecropper (Unió Rabassaires, 1935, 68–
69). In Llorenç del Penedés, a sharecropper worked the land 
under a rabassa morta contract that was more than one hun-
dred years old. After the 6th October, the sharecropper re-
ceived a judicial communication requesting the payment of 
1,100 pesetas. Even though he paid the required amount, he 
was evicted nonetheless (Unió Rabassaires 1935, 101). In 
Montcada i Reixac, the rabassas of twenty-nine rabassaires 
with seventy-year leases expired in 1931. Initially, the owner 
did not request the rabassaires to leave the land, perhaps in 
light of the political climate in the early years of the Republic. 
He did so however after the suspension of Catalan autonomy 
in October 1934 (Unió Rabassaires, 108–13). There were iso-
lated episodes of violence between evicted sharecroppers and 
landowners: for example the assassination of a landowner by 
an evicted sharecropper in the village of Blancafort in June 
1935, or an armed confrontation between peasants and land-
owners in the village of Solivella (Mayayo 1986, 397–98). 
The electoral victory of the Popular Front (a coalition of so-
cialists, communists and left-wing republicans) in February 
1936 turned the tables against the landowners. Land reform 
was immediately accelerated, through a number of decrees 
and ex-post legalizations of illegally occupied lands. The au-
tonomy of the Catalan government was reinstated and the 
Generalitat, once again under the control of Esquerra Republi-
cana, re-established the law on tenancy and sharecropping 
contracts (“law of conreus”) of 1934, which was very favoura-
ble to sharecroppers’ interests. Republican and left-wing 
mayors were reinstated.  
After five months of Popular Front government, a significant 
section of the armed forces led by prominent senior officers 
including General Franco staged a coup d’état in July 1936. 
The coup only succeeded in half of the territory, and, crucially, 
failed in the two main Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona. 
The partial failure of the military coup led to a three-year civil 
war (1936–39) that ended in the victory of the forces led by 
General Franco over the Republican government. Catalonia re-
mained a Republican stronghold for most of the war and was 
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not fully occupied by the Francoist forces until February 1939, 
just two months before the fall of the last Republican territory. 
This war, unlike most civil wars, was largely conventional (ac-
cording to Kalyvas (2005), it is actually prime example of a 
conventional civil war). The Spanish Civil War was fought by 
two conventional armies of considerable size (around one mil-
lion and a half combatants altogether in 1938) on mostly sta-
ble fronts. Neither the government nor the rebels encouraged 
guerrilla warfare. 
Instrumental in the defeat of the attempted coup in July 
1936 were both loyal members of the security forces (espe-
cially, members of the mostly Republican Guardia de Asalto –
Assault Guard) and militias from the main political parties and 
unions of the left. The success of the coup d’état in parts of 
the territory and the Republican government’s decision on 19 
July to hand over arms to the militias in order to defeat the 
rebels (Graham 2005, 78) led to a partial breakdown of state 
authority in the Republican territory, especially in the first four 
months of the war. In a few places, such as Murcia, Almeria 
and Alicante, where there was no coup or it was easily crushed, 
state authorities and local police loyal to the Republic re-
mained largely in control (Ledesma 2010), but, according to 
many sources, the state temporarily fell apart in most of the 
rest of the territory (Juliá 1999; Graham 2002; Ledesma 2003; 
Casanova 2007), or, at least, saw its authority severely dimin-
ished (Ruiz 2013, 22). According to Graham (2002, 81), 
“many middle class republican functionaries and elected offi-
cials prevaricated or ‘went missing’, fleeing their public respon-
sibilities. The judiciary collapsed. From the ministries down to 
municipal and village councils, the State was ceasing to func-
tion.” 
The breakdown of the state was also apparent in Catalonia. 
The militias largely replaced the state security forces (a process 
facilitated by the Catalan government’s 21 July 1936 order to 
all Catalan Civil Guard detachments to concentrate in Barce-
lona) and the judiciary was initially suspended and subse-
quently supplanted by so-called “popular courts”. During the 
first months those town councils that managed to survive at all 
were subordinated to local committees (Pozo 2002, 10; Martín 
2012, 26) composed of parties and unions of the Popular 
Front: anarchists, socialists, communists, Trotskyists, and also 
members of Esquerra Republicana and the Unió de Rabas-
saires, the main “rabasaire” union traditionally linked to Es-
querra. In small and middle-size towns, the Catalan autono-
mous state virtually ceased to exist. During the first months of 
the war the government even lost contact with provincial capi-
tals, especially Lleida where the revolutionary organizations 
forcibly seized the security forces headquarters (Pozo 2002, 
76–79).  
The above narrative shows why Catalonia during the Spanish 
Civil War offers an ideal case for our test of the grievances hy-
pothesis. There was an identifiable pre-war grievance: con-
tested property rights between landowners and sharecroppers. 
This conflict had a long history of mobilization since the crea-
tion of the first rabassaire unions in the 1870s, probably, as 
already noted, because local conditions for collective action 
were favourable. The grievance was made salient during the 
years immediately prior to the war, when relatively free expres-
sion of political demands was permitted during the Republican 
period. Its salience was further heightened by conflicts around 
land legislation adopted by left-wing governments in both Ma-
drid and Barcelona. This conflict left a history of political vio-
lence during the Republic in terms of riots, arrests, and evic-
tions of sharecroppers. There was, furthermore, an opportunity 
for extra-legal violence during the first months after the failure 
of the coup d’état, when the state’s infrastructure temporarily 
crumbled in Catalonia. Actually, most of the killings of civilians 
in the Republican territory, including Catalonia, took place dur-
ing the months from July to November 1936 (Solé i Sabaté 
and Vilarroya 1990). We thus find in this case the ideal condi-
tions for a fair test of the grievances hypothesis. It is that to 
which we now turn. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Violence in Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War 
Levels of violence against civilians in the Spanish Civil War 
were relatively high, especially compared to other “classical” 
civil wars, such as the American Civil War. The two sides killed 
at least 120,000 civilians between them (of these, roughly 
50,000 were killed in Republican territory) (Herreros and Cri-
ado 2009). For the case of Catalonia, we rely on the data on 
civilians killed during the war in the Republican rearguard from 
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Solé i Sabaté and Vilarroya (1990). Our dependent variable is 
aggregated civilian deaths in around one thousand Catalan 
municipalities excluding Barcelona.4 These deaths were the re-
sult of trials and summary executions in the rear areas, so the 
deceased were non-combatants (they were neither members 
of any of the militias that populated the Catalonian territory in 
the first months of the war nor soldiers of the regular Republi-
can army and security forces, and they were not killed in com-
bat). We have restricted the analysis to those killed in the pe-
riod July to November 1936. These are the months where the 
state authority in Catalonia was at its lowest ebb. After Novem-
ber, the state began a slow process of reimposing its authority 
across the Republican territory. In August 1936 the Republican 
government created the Popular Courts, with the intention of 
eliminating uncontrolled violence, but in Catalonia these 
courts did not begin work until October (Graham 2002, 160). 
It was also October when the Republican government put into 
motion the process of creating the Popular Army (to replace 
the militias) (Cardona 2006, 52), although in the case of Cat-
alonia this process was singularly slow (Viñas 2006, 347). It 
 
4 We have excluded Barcelona because of distorting factors ap-
plying to the capital; especially, some of the deaths were of peo-
ple arrested elsewhere and brought to the capital for trial. 
was during these months of relatively weak state authority that 
a window of opportunity opened for extra-legal violence.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of violence against civilians 
in proportion to population in Catalonia in the period July–No-
vember 1936, aggregated at municipality level. 
The data in the map refers to number of deaths per popula-
tion in the locality where each victim was killed. Other studies 
on violence against civilians in Catalonia have considered 
deaths by victim’s birthplace.  
 
This ignores labour market fluidity and significant population 
mobility in those years. One potential bias in attributing deaths 
to the place of execution is that prisoners detained elsewhere 
could have been brought there to be tried and subsequently 
executed. If this were the case, we would not be capturing the 
effects of local conditions on the variation of violence against 
civilians. However, this is not problematic for the period under 
analysis. It was not until 1937 that judicial procedures were 
centralized under the control of state authorities in Catalonia 
Figure 1: Civilians killed in Catalonia, July-November 1936 
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(one example the trial in Barcelona of Trotskyists and anar-
chists after May 1937). In July–November 1936, a period 
where militias and local committees were hegemonic, victims 
of violence were generally killed on the spot. We have also ex-
cluded the victims of anti-clerical violence, as we believe that 
this type of violence follows its own logic and could bias the 
analysis. 
 
4.1. Pre-war Grievances: Data on the Rabassaire Conflict 
Our main indicator for pre-war grievances associated to the 
rabassaire conflict is evictions of tenants and sharecroppers 
after October 1934 (Unió de Rabassaires 1935). As a second 
indicator we use lawsuits filed by rabassaires for revision of 
contracts in 1932 (Generalitat de Catalunya 1933).   
Both variables are connected to pre–civil war mobilization of 
the grievances experienced by the rabasser sharecroppers. 
This connection is especially clear in the case of evictions. After 
hundreds of sharecroppers were evicted from their plots in 
1935, the issue was strongly mobilized by the sharecropper 
union Unió de Rabassaires and the political party Esquerra Re-
publicana de Catalunya in the February 1936 elections. There 
were also isolated acts of violence between evicted sharecrop-
pers and landowners in the months before the war. This means 
that the variable “evictions” captures intense mobilization in 
the months immediately prior to the war. The geographical dis-
tribution of evictions across villages is shown in Figure 2. Law-
suits serve as an indicator because, as we have already men-
tioned, thousands of lawsuits for revision of sharecropper con-
tracts were systematically rejected by the courts in 1932. This 
variable is probably a poorer indicator of mobilization than 
evictions, as it refers to events that occurred four years prior to 
the war. 
Figure 2: Evictions of rabassaires (1935) 
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As we argue in the theoretical section, those who held pre-
war grievances were able to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties for extra-legal violence opened up by the war. Violence can 
be carried out individually or through organizations. The main 
sharecroppers’ organization was the Unió de Rabassaires. If 
the violence was at least in part collective, we would expect, 
firstly, that it would be more prevalent in areas where there was 
a local branch of the rabassaire union. Secondly, we would 
expect to see an interaction effect between the presence of the 
rabassaire union and the intensity of the grievance on violence. 
In those places where the Unió de Rabassaires had a local 
branch, it would have been easier to organize collective vio-
lence to redress those grievances. The source for this variable 
(presence of a local branch of the Unió de Rabassaires) is Po-
més (2000).  
 
The summary statistics of these and other independent vari-
ables included in the models are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 includes several control variables that the literature 
on political violence and secondary literature on the Spanish 
Civil War suggest are related to violence against civilians. Bal-
cells (2010, 2017) shows the closeness of competition in the 
1936 general election to be an important determinant of vio-
lence against civilians in Catalonia during the war. The index 
of competitiveness is:  
1-(%VoteLeft36-%VoteRight36)2. 
Votes for right-wing parties in the February 1936 Spanish 
parliamentary elections supply an indicator of potential oppo-
sition to the incumbent’s rule. While all rear territory was in 
principle under the control of the Republican forces, this con-
trol could have been considered shakier in those areas where 
pre-war support for political forces that had supported the 
coup d’état was higher. In these areas where there are poten-
tially more opponents, there was a possibility to apply pre-
emptive violence against potential political entrepreneurs (Her-
reros and Criado 2009). Some authors, such as Ruiz (2013) 
argue that much of the violence in Republican territory was 
driven by a perception that the rearguard was full of enemies 
of the Republic that had to be 
suppressed in order to consoli-
date control of the territory. Ac-
cording to this, we would expect 
more violence in areas where sup-
port for right-wing candidates was 
stronger. “Border front” is another 
variable related to the strategic 
control theory. When a town is 
close to the battlefront, the oppo-
sition forces in the rearguard can 
count on the support of the en-
emy on the other side of the line. 
In these areas, therefore, opposi-
tion to the Republican forces’ 
control of the territory would be 
more likely. In terms of Kalyvas’ 
theory (2006), these would be 
places where control of the terri-
tory is hegemonic but not com-
plete, which, in turn, would generate incentives for further re-
pression. We include two variables related to the strength of 
the state: elevation and distance to Barcelona. The weakness 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Evictions 1935       1.321        8.703   0     207 1028 
Lawsuits 1932      12.796       76.875   0    1290 1019 
Union 1933        0.183        0.386   0         1 1027 
Population 1930 1722.715  3760.093 73 44417 1028 
Right-wing vote 1936    48.015      16.825 2.7     100 1021 
CNT 1931  116.523    930.220   0 15986 1028 
CNT 1936     37.922   269.755   0    6130 1028 
Competition1936      0.885       0.156   0         1 1023 
Border front       0.228       0.420   0         1 1011 
Elevation  363.870   316.397   3    1539 869 
Distance to Barcelona   92.362     40.314 6.3     252 1009 
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of the state is, according to the literature, a strong predictor of 
civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Laitin 2007). Mountain-
ous terrain is considered a proxy of state weakness (see for 
example Fearon and Laitin 2003). The rationale is that the 
reach of state power is weaker in mountainous areas because 
communication with the centre is more difficult. The same logic 
applies to the variable “Distance to Barcelona”: state control 
would be weaker the farther a town is from the capital. 
The models include another control variable: militants of the 
anarchist union CNT per village. According to most historians, 
the militias formed by the CNT were responsible for many kill-
ings of civilians in the Republican rearguard. There is numerous 
anecdotal evidence on killings by anarchist militias across Re-
publican territory, and especially in Catalonia, which was the 
main anarchist stronghold in 1936 (see for example Casanova 
1999, 129; Martín 2012, 33, 34, 109; Ledesma 2010, 188–
 
5 Sources: for 1931, Cucó Giner 1970; for 1936, Solidaridad 
Obrera, 6 May 1936 
89). We have data on CNT membership for 
two periods: in 1931, the inaugural year of 
the Spanish Second Republic (when the an-
archist union was at its strongest), and in 
1936, from the Anarchist Congress of Zara-
goza, carried out just two months before the 
outbreak of the civil war.5 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The “grievance hypothesis” proposes that 
pre-war grievances are a predictor of violence 
against civilians during the war. We add two 
conditions to this basic hypothesis: pre-war 
grievances have to have been politically mo-
bilized in the years immediately prior to the 
war, and a window of opportunity has to have 
opened to apply extra-legal violence. The 
case of the rabbassaire conflict in Catalonia during the Span-
ish Civil War meets these two extra conditions. Concretely, we 
consider the following specific hypotheses on the effects of 
grievances on violence in the Catalan case: 
H1: Violence will be higher in villages with pre-war grievances 
related to the rabassaire question. 
H2: The presence of rabassaire organizations will increase 
the probability of violence against civilians during the war. 
H3: Violence against civilians is expected to be higher in vil-
lages where there were both pre-war grievances related to the 
rabassaire question and a local branch of the rabassaire un-
ion.  
These hypotheses were tested using the following model: 
 
Figure 3. Histogram for number of deaths 
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Yi is number of civilian deaths per village. The independent 
variables in the model are those discussed in the previous sec-
tion. As our dependent variable is number of deaths, we esti-
mated a negative binominal count model. The significant like-
lihood ratio test for alpha=0 indicated that a negative binomial 
model is preferred to a Poisson model (our outcome count var-
iable is overdispersed). As can be seen in Figure 3, the count 
variable has an excessive number of zeros, and a significant z-
test indicates that the zero-inflated negative binomial model is 
preferred to the ordinary negative binomial regression. 
The negative binomial models are clearly a good fit, as 
shown in Figure 4, which compares predicted with observed 
counts. 
As additional tests for the 
above hypotheses, we estimated 
models with a dichotomous in-
dependent variable for griev-
ances (evictions) and a model 
with an interaction term between 
grievances and the existence of a 
local branch of the rabassaire 
union. 
 
5. Results 
In order to gauge the effect of 
pre-war grievances on violence, 
we analyse first the Spearman 
rank-order correlations of the 
various counts of events in Table 
2. It is clear from the analysis 
that at least one of the pre-war 
dimensions of conflict, evictions 
of rabassaires in 1935, can be 
linked to lethal violence against civilians, while the other, liti-
gation, is not significantly correlated. 
This is also the case for the variable for the presence of a 
rabassaire union in 1933. Right-wing vote shows a negative 
correlation, which means that violence was actually lower in 
right-wing strongholds. The two variables associated to the 
strength of state control – distance to Barcelona and elevation 
– are both negatively related to violence, contrary to expecta-
tions.   
Table 3 shows a multivariate analysis of the determinants of 
violence against civilians in July–November 1936. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted vs. observed counts, negative binomial models for number of deaths 
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Table 2: Spearman rank correlations, violence against civilians (July–November 1936). 
Left-wing 
violence 
Lit.  Eviction  
Union 
1933  
CNT 
1931 
CNT 
1936 
Comp.  
Right-
wing 
Pop. 
Dist. 
BCN  
Border 
            
Litigation   0.06           
Evictions   0.18*  0.09*          
Union 1933  0.21*  0.20*  0.41*         
CNT 1931  0.28*  0.04  0.11* 0.16*        
CNT 1936  0.25* -0.009  0.08*  .12*        
Comp.   0.10* -0.05*  0.04  0.04 -0.009       
Right-wing -0.07* -0.17* -0.02 -0.12* -0.13* -0.14*  0.17*     
Population   0.36*  0.16*  0.24*  0.28*  0.36*  0.42*  0.11* -0.15*    
Distance BCN -0.20* -0.16* -0.28* -0.50* -0.19* -0.06*  0.01 -0.12* -0.11*   
Border -0.10* -0.07* -0.12* -0.24* -0.10  0.01  0.04 -0.09*  0.11* 0.63*  
Elevation -0.18* -0.10* -0.07* -0.11* -0.15* -0.18* -0.02*  0.20* -0.25* 0.10*  0.08* 
 
Models 1 to 3 show that several of the bivariate correlations 
in Table 2 do not stand the test of the multivariate analysis. 
Models 1 and 2 include the two indicators of grievances sep-
arately, while Model 3 includes both at the same time. Litiga-
tion does not have a discernible effect on violence against ci-
vilians. The positive relation between evictions and violence, 
however, remains. The probability of violence is higher in vil-
lages where rabassaire sharecroppers were evicted after the 
failure of the proclamation of the Catalan State in October 
1934. This effect stands if we operationalize evictions as a 
dummy variable (with value 1 for villages where at least one 
sharecropper was evicted and value 0 where there were no 
evictions), as we do in Model 4.  
The effect of evictions on civilian deaths in the war is shown 
in Figure 5. There is a small but significant effect: from 1.39 
predicted deaths in villages without evictions to 2.65 deaths 
in those villages that suffered twenty evictions, with all the re-
mainder variables at their means. This result clearly supports 
our first hypothesis, which proposes an effect of a pre-war 
grievance on civilian victimization during the war.  
The models also show, in accordance with our second hy-
pothesis, that the presence of a rabassaire union is associated 
with increased probability of civilian deaths, which suggests 
that perhaps at least part of the violence was carried out 
through collective organizations. The presence of the revolu-
tionary anarchist union CNT does not in fact have any effect on 
number of civilians executed, contrary to most of the historical 
literature, while the presence of the rabassaire union does. This 
effect remains even if we estimate the models using CNT affil-
iation in 1931 (not shown in Table 3), when the anarchist un-
ion was considerably stronger. The size of the effect of the pres-
ence of a local branch of the rabassaire union on number of 
civilians killed is seen in Figure 6. While the expected number 
of deaths (with all the other variables at their means) is 1.35 
in localities without a local branch of the rabassaire union, the 
equivalent figure for localities with one is 1.97.  
This idea acquires further support from Model 5, which in-
cludes an interaction between evictions and the presence of a 
local branch of the Unió de Rabassaires to test our third hy-
pothesis. In villages that experienced evictions in the months 
previous to the war and also had a local branch of the share-
croppers’ union, the probability of violence against civilians 
was higher than in villages without a union organization. This 
effect is captured in Figure 7. 
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Table 3: Pre-war grievances and violence against civilians in Catalonia (July-November 1936). 
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Models 
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In villages with a local branch of the Unió de Rabassaires, the 
expected number of civilian deaths was 1.87 where there were 
no evictions and 3.55 in villages with twenty evictions. The 
equivalent figures for villages without a local branch of the ra-
bassaire union were 1.29 with no evictions and 2.42 with 
twenty evictions. So the presence of the union increases is as-
sociated with an elevated number of civilian deaths and a 
magnified effect of evictions on violence. It 
is possible that at least part of the violence 
was conducted collectively through local or-
ganizations.  
The other variables associated with vio-
lence against civilians during the war were 
mostly non-significant. The exception is the 
competitiveness of the 1936 parliamentary 
elections, which remains the most relevant 
explanatory variable in the model, in line 
with Balcells (2010, 2011, 2017). The 
models also show that variables associated 
with the theory that connects control of ter-
ritory and presence of opposition to vio-
lence are either not significant – this is the 
case with the variable borderfront – or sig-
nificant but in the opposite direction, as in 
the case of right-wing vote. This is probably be-
cause the Spanish Civil War, unlike most con-
temporary civil wars, was a conventional war. 
This meant that divided control of the territory 
between the warring parties and informational 
problems about the presence of opposition to 
each warring party’s rule were much less com-
mon than in unconventional, guerrilla forms of 
war. Behind the battlefront, rear areas were 
mostly under the control of one of the warring 
parties. According to Kalyvas (2006), in these 
areas, where the control of the territory by one 
of the warring parties is complete, there is no 
violence against civilians.  
It seems, therefore, that there is a measurable 
effect of pre-war grievances measured in terms 
of evictions of rabassaires in 1935, a year be-
fore the outbreak of the civil war, and violence against civilians 
during the war. This effect was stronger in villages where the 
rabassaire union had a local branch, which suggest that polit-
ical entrepreneurs could have played a role in mobilizing and 
politicizing the grievances. We now report some robustness 
checks. We estimate the models with two different dependent 
Figure 5: Pre-war evictions and violence during the war 
 
Figure 6: Presence of rabassaire union branch and violence against civilians 
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variables: total number of people executed including anticleri-
cal violence, and our original dependent variable excluding 
outliers.  
The results of the robustness 
checks are shown in Figure 8, 
which shows the predicted number 
of people killed for a model that in-
cludes anti-clerical violence (left-
hand side) and a model that ex-
cludes two outliers with an excep-
tionally high number of rabassaires 
evicted in 1935 (the villages of Am-
posta and Tortosa). The results 
largely confirm those of the previ-
ous models: evictions of rabas-
saires significantly increase the ex-
pected number of people killed in 
the first months of the civil war. The 
interaction effect of the presence of 
a local branch of the rabassaire un-
ion and pre-war grievances on vio-
lence also holds in the models esti-
mated with these two dependent varia-
bles, as can be seen in Figure 9.  
 
6. Micro Dynamics of Local Vio-
lence against Civilians 
We have seen that pre-war griev-
ances around property rights experi-
enced by sharecroppers in Catalonia in 
the years prior to the Spanish Civil War 
did indeed have an effect on violence 
against civilians during the war. In vil-
lages where rabassaires were evicted 
in the year prior to the outbreak of the 
civil war, violence against civilians was 
higher. In this section we provide more 
detail on the connection between pre-
war grievances and violence against 
landowners in Catalan villages during 
the first months of the civil war.   
Figure 7: Pre-war grievances and violence in villages with and without a local 
branch of sharecroppers’ union 
 
Figure 8: Prediction with different dependent variables 
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By combining Sole i Sabate and Vilarroya’s (1990) data on 
the names of civilian deaths with the data about the names of 
the landowners who evicted sharecroppers collected by the 
Unió de Rabassaires (1935) we are able to identify 28 out of 
502 (5.57 percent) landowners who evicted sharecroppers in 
1934–35 that were killed in the period July–November 1936. 
Further evidence on violence perpetrated by rabassaires can 
be obtained from the files of the Causa General (General Case) 
compiled by the Francoist authorities. The Francoist authorities 
had an obvious interest in maximizing the crimes committed 
by the Republicans during the war, so the Causa General has 
to be interpreted cautiously as it is likely to suffer upward bias. 
However, it remains an important source quantifying violence 
against civilians in the territory under the control of the Repub-
lic, and all historical analyses on violence during the Spanish 
Civil War (including Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya 1990) use it 
extensively, even if they cross-check the data on civilian deaths 
with registry office data and exclude soldiers killed in action 
that are sometimes included as civilian victims. We used it to 
see whether there was any mention of evicted sharecroppers 
as members of local revolutionary committees or participants 
in violence against civilians in places where landowners who 
evicted sharecroppers in 1934–35 were killed. 
There were executions of landowners who had evicted share-
croppers in twenty-one Catalan villages. The Causa General 
does not provide any information about four of these villages. 
Of the remaining seventeen, we have found that evicted rabas-
saires were mentioned as participants in the local revolutionary 
committees and/or as presumed perpetrators of violence 
against civilians, looting and destruction of ecclesiastical prop-
erty in eleven, while there was no mention of evicted rabas-
saires in the case of six of the villages. In the town of Arbeca, 
four of evicted sharecroppers were members of the local revo-
lutionary committee that, according to the Causa General, was 
directly responsible for crimes committed in the village. In Ba-
tea, an evicted rabassaire was a member of the new town 
council and apparently “took part directly or indirectly in all the 
crimes committed”. Evicted sharecroppers were also men-
tioned as responsible for crimes, and in some cases also as 
members of the local revolutionary committee or town council 
Figure 9. Effect of the presence of UR and pre-war grievances with different dependent variables 
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of Brull, Fontrubí, Gandesa (where one evicted rabassaire was 
accused of being the leader of “death patrols”), Mediona, Prat 
de Compte (where one evicted rabassaire was accused of 
“several assassinations”) and Sant Martí Sarroca. In villages 
such as Castelví de la Marca, Fontrubí and Olérdola, “rabas-
saire leaders” were accused of cooperating with the local Rev-
olutionary Committee in the assassination of landowners. In 
other villages, such as Mediona, San Sadurní and Subirats, 
again according to the Causa General files, landowners only 
avoided being murdered by the local peasants because they 
fled to Francoist territory.6 In the town of Tordera, one evicted 
sharecropper was considered “morally or politically responsi-
ble for the criminal acts committed after 18 July 1936”. In 
Moia, one evicted rabassaire was a member of the local revo-
lutionary committee, although the Causa General files do not 
make any allegations about involvement in a specific crime, 
apart from explicitly assuming that the revolutionary committee 
was responsible for all crimes committed during the Republi-
can period. In the village of Cubelles, where four rabassaires 
were evicted in 1935, the local branch of the rabassaire union 
UR was considered responsible for the crimes committed – in-
cluding  the assassination of an evicting landowner – as mem-
ber of the local council. All this evidence from the Causa Gen-
eral, even if, as as already mentioned, it has to be interpreted 
cautiously, at least shows that some of the rabassaires evicted 
in the year prior to the outbreak of the civil war occupied rele-
vant positions in the revolutionary organizations that were 
largely in charge of villages where some landowners that had 
evicted rabassaires in 1935 were assassinated in the first 
months of the war. For many of these rabassaires, the evictions 
would have been very traumatic, especially given that in some 
cases they had been working the same land for a very long 
time. The evicted sharecroppers considered responsible for vi-
olence against civilians and destruction of property in the 
Causa General held rabassa morta contracts whose duration, 
according to the Unió de Rabbassaires (1935) ranged from 
four years in some cases up to seventy years in one case (in 
 
6 Source: Archivo Histórico Nacional http://pares.mcu.es/Pares-
Busquedas/servlets/Control_servlet?ac-
cion=3&txt_id_desc_ud=2600914&fromagenda=I&txt_primer-
Contiene=1 
the town of Sant Martí Sarroca) and to “time immemorial” in 
the case of one evicted sharecropper in the town of Brull. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The case of contested property rights in Catalonia during the 
Spanish Civil War shows a non-negligible effect of pre-war 
grievances on violence against civilians during the war. While 
most investigations into violence against civilians in civil wars 
stress the role of endogenous factors, especially control of ter-
ritory in non-conventional civil wars, our result vindicates to a 
certain extent the idea that pre-war grievances can partly ex-
plain violence against civilians during civil wars. Although we 
cannot directly extrapolate these results to civil wars in general, 
they certainly offer some clues about when and how economic 
inequality, exploitation and social discrimination can affect vi-
olence against civilians in civil wars. When these grievances 
are intensely mobilized in the immediate pre-war period and 
state authority partially collapses (which is quite common in 
most – but not all – civil wars), pre-war grievances have the 
potential to unleash violence during the war. Our article shows 
that violence associated with state collapse is not just caused 
by dynamics of the war itself, such as wartime revenge and 
common criminality, but is also the consequence of cycles of 
grievance and revenge initiated before the outbreak of the war. 
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